Who Writes the Bills

Committee capacity: fewer panels, far fewer meetings, fewer House committee staff

Brookings counts 314 committee panels in the 96th Congress, 1979–80 (Brookings, Vital Statistics on Congress, Chapter 4). Among the 28 Congresses it lists, the count peaked at 385 in the 94th (1975–76), fell to 198 in the 104th (1995–96) and stands at 226 in the 119th, which is in progress: 136 House and 94 Senate panels (Exhibit 32; Brookings, Chapter 4). That is 28% fewer than the 314 of the 96th (Brookings, Chapter 4). Joint panels count once in the total. The 96th count includes ten House task forces; without them it is 304 and the fall is 26% (Brookings, Table 4-2).

Meetings fell faster than panels. The House held 7,033 committee and subcommittee meetings in the 96th Congress and 1,741 in the 118th, a decline of 75% (Brookings, Vital Statistics on Congress, Chapter 6). The Senate went from 3,790 to 1,134, a decline of 70% (Exhibit 33; Brookings, Chapter 6). Together, committee and subcommittee meetings fell 73%, from 10,823 to 2,875 (Brookings, Chapter 6).

Timing matters for the House. Panels fell from 193 in the 96th Congress to 146 in the 103rd (1993–94), then to 110 in the 104th under the 1995 reorganization (−24.7%), while meetings fell 11.8% (4,304 to 3,796; Brookings, Chapter 4; Chapter 6). Meetings per panel went from 36.4 to 29.5 between the 96th and 103rd, then rose to 34.5 (Brookings, Chapter 4; Chapter 6). The House then added panels, reaching 135 in the 118th (136 in the 119th), while meetings per panel fell to 12.9 (Brookings, Chapter 4; Chapter 6). Fewer, busier panels fit 1995 and do not fit the years since.

CRS counts committee staff from House and Senate telephone directories. House committee staff was 1,947 in 1994 and 1,258 in 1995, the largest one-year drop in the series (−35%), and 1,306 in 1996, 33% below 1994 (Exhibit 34; CRS R43947). Brookings’ Table 5-5, a different series, shows the same break, from 2,046 to 1,246 (Brookings, Vital Statistics on Congress, Table 5-5). The opening rules package of the 104th Congress required the cut: H. Res. 6 abolished three committees, capped subcommittees, took independent hiring from subcommittees, barred proxy voting and joint referrals, and provided that “Committee staff will be reduced by at least one third from the 103d Congress levels” (CRS 95-187). Senate committee staff fell 15% over the same two years and was 1,194 in 2022, above its 1994 level, while House committee staff, after a 2010 peak of 1,508, was 1,178 in 2022 (1,170 in 2023; CRS R43947; CRS R43946).

The decline is concentrated in committees. House committee staff fell from 1,861 in 1979 to 1,170 in 2023, down 37% (CRS R43947). All House staff rose from 9,045 in 1979 to 9,247 in 2023, and Member offices held near 6,700 (CRS R43947). Committee staff fell to 63% of its 1979 level, cutting its share of House staff from 20.6% to 12.7% (Exhibit 35; CRS R43947). Officers and officials rose from 357 to 1,190 staff, and leadership from 65 to 188 (CRS R43947).

The committee-staff series mixes two counting methods. CRS used printed-directory listings through 2019, where staff listed under more than one entity can be counted more than once, and the online directory, which counts them once, for 2020–2023; it says this reduced its House counts by approximately 250 staff a year after 2020 (CRS R43947). It gives no committee-only figure, and committee staff shows no step between 2019 (1,229) and 2020 (1,290; CRS R43947). The 37% fall therefore compares two methods; on the printed-directory method alone, 1979 to 2019 is a fall of 34% (CRS R43947).

The categories are not fixed. Officers and officials include the Clerk, the Chief Administrative Officer and the Legislative Counsel, and CRS says duties now done by the Chief Administrative Officer were “previously overseen by” the Committee on House Administration, the Clerk or the Sergeant at Arms. In 1995, as committee staff fell from 1,947 to 1,258, officers and officials rose from 521 to 818, and CRS lists “increased reliance on centrally provided technical services (including information technology, legislative drafting, and physical and digital security)” as one possible reason (CRS R43947). The category also swings on its own: it fell 33% in 1993 (537 to 359) and was back at 521 in 1994 (CRS R43947). The counts cannot separate reclassification from new work in the 833-person rise (CRS R43947).

Throughput and attention: more bills, fewer laws, topics that diverge

Members introduced 12,583 bills and joint resolutions in the 96th Congress and 16,554 in the 118th, a rise of 32% (Brookings, Chapter 6). Public laws fell from 613 to 274, a fall of 55% (Brookings, Chapter 6). Laws per 100 measures introduced went from 4.87 to 1.66, and the highest value since 1979 was 7.44 in the 100th Congress (1987–88; Exhibit 36; Brookings, Chapter 6; CRS 96-727). Earlier House counts were shaped by cosponsor limits (25 from 1967, none from 1979), which led many Members to introduce identical bills, so the comparison starts at the 96th Congress (CRS 96-727).

Several things move the ratio. Introductions rose before any committee acts, enactments depend on floor time and the Senate, and omnibus packaging combines appropriations across topics. The ratio measures selectivity and says nothing direct about how well committees draft.

The Comparative Agendas Project (CAP) codes each congressional hearing by topic. Of 65,267 hearings from 1971 to 2010, Government Operations is the largest topic with 8,339, or 12.8%, followed by Defense (8.5%), Banking, Finance, and Domestic Commerce (8.4%), International Affairs and Foreign Aid (8.1%) and Health (7.5%; Exhibit 37; CAP, U.S. Congressional Hearings).

Hearings and law rows point to different topics. Government Operations’ share of hearings fell from 22.0% in the 1950s to 11.3% in the 2000s, while its share of CAP’s public-law rows rose from 20.7% to 36.0% (Exhibit 38; CAP, U.S. Congressional Hearings; CAP, U.S. Public Laws). CAP flags 464 of the 846 Government Operations law rows in the 2000s (55%) as commemorative, against 6% in the 1950s; the 464 are 20% of all 2,352 law rows that decade (CAP, U.S. Public Laws). CAP has one row per public law, and its rows are 98% of Brookings’ count in the 82nd–86th Congresses, so the shares describe laws, not bills (CAP, U.S. Public Laws; Brookings, Chapter 6).

Floor days rose while floor hours per day fell. The House was in session 326 days in the 96th Congress and 350 in the 118th, and the Senate 333 and 354 (Brookings, Chapter 6). Hours per day fell, in the House from 5.8 to 3.6 and in the Senate from 7.0 to 4.6, after a House high of 8.3 in the 104th Congress (2,445 hours over 296 days; Exhibit 39; Brookings, Chapter 6).

The legislative branch’s own resources, and what FY2027 proposes

The legislative branch received 0.37% of discretionary budget authority in FY2025, by OMB’s historical Table 5.4. The share was 0.48% in FY1995 (the high) and 0.28% in FY2020 (the low), and it averages 0.39% over FY1976–FY2025 (Exhibit 40; OMB, Table 5.4). CRS reports about 0.40% since FY1976 and 0.36% for FY2006–FY2026 (CRS R43397). The denominator moves too: from FY2019 to FY2020 legislative branch budget authority rose 6.1% while total discretionary rose 37.9%, and in FY2009 the total rose 26.5% against 12.9% for the branch (OMB, Table 5.4).

In constant 2026 dollars, legislative branch funding is $7.26 billion in FY2026, 26% above FY2017 ($5.75 billion) and 8.5% above FY2010 ($6.69 billion; CRS R49049). In current dollars the total rose 63.5% from FY2017 to FY2026 (CRS R49049). Applying the same deflator to each part (CRS’s FY2017 ratio of constant to current dollars, 1.2953), real growth was 67% for Capitol Police (117% current), 24% for CBO (61%), 15% for GAO (49%) and −3% for CRS (26%; CRS R49049; CRS R43397).

FY2026 appropriations provide $216.1 million for House committees ($184.8 million for those other than Appropriations), 10.4% of the House’s $2.083 billion, and $245.1 million for Senate committees ($222.4 million for inquiries and investigations and $22.7 million for Appropriations), 16.7% of its $1.467 billion (CRS R49049). Together the accounts are $461 million, 6.4% of the legislative branch total (CRS R49049).

Brookings’ Table 5-1 stops at 2015. GAO staff fell from 5,303 in 1979 to 2,989 in 2015 (−44%), CRS from 847 to 609 (−28%), and CBO rose from 204 to 235 (+15%; Exhibit 41; Brookings, Vital Statistics on Congress, Table 5-1). The Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), created in 1972, had about 140 staff and over $20 million a year at its peak in the early 1990s, and Congress stopped funding it after FY1995 (CRS RS21586). Current counts use other measures and are not spliced onto Exhibit 41: GAO reports 3,556 full-time equivalents in FY2025 and 3,353 in FY2026 and asks for 3,210 for FY2027 (GAO-26-900719).

For FY2027, nothing proposed is in force. A continuing resolution, P.L. 119-103 (H.R. 6500), signed September 2, 2026, funds all 12 regular bills, including the Legislative Branch Appropriations Act, 2026, at a rate based on FY2026 through December 11, 2026 (CRS R49353). As of September 17 the House had passed three of 12 bills, none for the legislative branch, and the Senate Appropriations Committee had reported none (CRS R49353). The proposals are unenacted: the legislative branch requested $8.512 billion, 17.3% above FY2026, and on May 20 the House Appropriations Committee ordered H.R. 9010 reported with $5.442 billion, excluding Senate items, 1.7% below the comparable FY2026 level (CRS R49049). For House committees other than Appropriations, the bill provides $174.8 million on the operating line, which excludes hearing-room renovation, 5.4% below FY2026’s $184.8 million; the request was $191.0 million (+3.4%; CRS R49049). Renovation ($19.7 million requested, $10.0 million reported) sits in the same subtotal, so CRS’s $210.7 million (+14.0%) for the request includes it, and the reported bill’s $184.8 million with renovation is level with FY2026 (CRS R49049). The bill gives GAO $611.9 million, 24.6% below FY2026 (CRS R49049).

Three readings, and what the data cannot settle

The capacity reading holds that the loss of committee staff and meetings reduced Congress’s ability to write and scrutinize law and moved that work to outside parties. An open letter published by the R Street Institute in March 2016, signed for five organizations, said Congress was “doing government on the cheap” and a “farm league for K Street” (R Street Institute, March 9, 2016). Its claim that House committees were “at about half of their 1980 staffing levels” is not reproduced by any series: CRS counts 1,262 in 2014 against 1,991 in 1980 (63%), Brookings’ Table 5-5 1,134 against 1,917 (59%), and its Table 5-1, which adds select committee staff, 1,163 against 2,027 in 1979 (57%; CRS R43947; Brookings, Table 5-1; Table 5-5). Table 5-5 covers only standing-committee statutory and investigative staff through 1986, so the bases differ, but none reaches half. The Congressional Management Foundation (CMF) told the Modernization Committee in May 2021 that Congress is “significantly overmatched,” that staff average 2.5 years in Member offices and 2.7 in committee and leadership offices, and that a three-year House legislative aide could raise pay 25% to 50% by moving to a trade association or lobbying firm (CMF testimony, May 6, 2021). POPVOX argued in June 2024, after the Supreme Court ended Chevron deference, that the response “will require significant investment in committee staff and additional resources” (POPVOX Foundation, June 28, 2024).

A CMF survey of senior staff, fielded from August to October 2016, gives a more mixed picture (CMF, State of the Congress, 2017). In Brookings’ tabulation of 184 respondents, net satisfaction was +49 points on access to high-quality nonpartisan expertise within the legislative branch and +22 on staff knowledge and skills, and −38 on Members having adequate time to deliberate and −23 on technology (Brookings, September 11, 2017).

The offset reading holds that Congress consolidated and centralized, moving capacity to other offices. The 1995 cut in House panels came with more meetings per panel (above). CRS gives the case for altering committee jurisdictions as jurisdictions that “may be outdated, fragmented, and overlapping,” and the case against as overlap that is “impossible to eliminate” (CRS RS21643). Officers and officials added 833 positions as committees lost 691, and CRS names centrally provided drafting, information technology and security among the possible reasons (CRS R43947). GAO reports it does work for the chairs or ranking members of over 90% of standing committees, so committees draw on support agencies that committee headcounts omit (GAO-26-900719). A related reading puts authority in party leadership: the Cato Institute wrote that “for ascendant party leadership in Congress, strong committees were a roadblock to the consolidation of authority,” which fits leadership staff rising from 65 to 188 (Cato Institute, January 2, 2020; CRS R43947).

The delegation reading holds that Congress leaves more detail to executive agencies, which would lower the count of laws without lowering the policy made. CRS makes this case for private bills, most of which concerned immigration cases or private claims: “Congress has delegated more of its authority on individual immigration matters and private claims to the executive branch, so the number of private bills and laws has declined dramatically” (CRS 96-727). Private laws fell from 123 in the 96th Congress to 6 in the 108th, but they are counted apart from public laws and do not explain Exhibit 36 (CRS 96-727). For public laws, POPVOX describes “the ability to punt many policy details to Executive branch agencies” as a significant factor in Congress’s approach for forty years (POPVOX Foundation, June 28, 2024).

The exhibits establish that committee staff, meetings and the share of bills enacted are lower than in 1979. They do not establish that the first two cause the third.

• No source counts bills by drafter. Legislative Counsel sits in the officers-and-officials category, and committee staff, Member offices, support agencies and outside parties all contribute.
• Introductions rose 32% while laws fell 55% (Brookings, Chapter 6). Thinner capacity or a different mix of bills would fit that pattern.

Options

Option: committee staff as a fixed share of the legislative branch budget. For: committee staff fell furthest of any House category, and the House-reported FY2027 bill, a proposal while the continuing resolution holds FY2026 rates, would fund the operating line for other committees 5.4% below FY2026 while the House total rises 1.2% (CRS R43947; CRS R49049; CRS R49353). Restoring the 691-position gap to 1979 at the FY2026 account per committee staff member comes to about $128 million: the FY2026 House committee account of $216.081 million divided by the 1,170 committee staff of 2023 is $184.7 thousand, and 691 positions at that rate come to $127.6 million (CRS R49049; CRS R43947). This is illustrative arithmetic: it pairs FY2026 funding with 2023 staffing, and the account also pays nonpersonnel costs. Against: the denominator moves for unrelated reasons. The Architect of the Capitol is $850 million of the $1.25 billion increase requested for FY2027 (its $1,661,672 thousand requested less $811,916 thousand enacted for FY2026, against $8,512,930 thousand requested less $7,258,196 thousand for the whole branch), and Capitol Police funding rose 67% in constant dollars from FY2017 to FY2026 (CRS R49049; CRS R43397). A share of today’s 6.4% would lock in the present ratio, and CMF’s evidence centers on pay and tenure, which a headcount floor does not address (CRS R49049; CMF testimony, May 6, 2021).

Option: a CBO-style technical-assistance office. For: Congress had one in OTA, and the Modernization Committee recommended more policy-staff capacity “especially for Committees, policy support organizations and a restored Office of Technology Assessment” (H. Rept. 116-562). GAO’s technology-assessment team works “in the absence of a reestablished” OTA (H. Rept. 117-656). CBO, at 274 filled positions and $74.8 million in FY2026, is 1.0% of the legislative branch total (CRS R43397; CBO, Request for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2027). Against: CRS records critics’ reasons for ending OTA: reports too late for congressional schedules, limited usefulness to decisions, and alleged bias or partisan politics. Others said Congress could turn to the National Academies, GAO and CRS (CRS RS21586). The House-reported FY2027 bill proposes GAO funding 24.6% below FY2026, and a new office would compete for the same appropriation (CRS R49049; GAO-26-900719).

Option: shared hearing calendars and committee-only time. For: the Modernization Committee reports that Members typically serve on more than five committees and subcommittees, cites a Bipartisan Policy Center analysis finding that on one morning 131 Members (30% of the House) had conflicting committee meetings, and recommends committee-only meeting times and a common calendar portal (H. Rept. 116-562). Against: the 1993 joint committee’s House members proposed exclusive periods for committee and floor work, and those recommendations “did not receive a vote” (H. Rept. 116-562). A calendar rule would reallocate scarce Member time among the House’s 136 panels and add no staff (Brookings, Chapter 4).

Option: regular-order rules. For: the Modernization Committee wrote that the departure from regular order in appropriations brings “increased dysfunction, budgetary inefficiencies, and less accountability” (H. Rept. 116-562). CRS found that the House’s long-standing practice was to take up regular appropriations bills separately under open rules, and that modified-open and structured rules limiting amendments came into use from the 113th Congress (CRS 98-612; CRS R46841). Against: the Modernization Committee called open rules and unlimited debate “oft debated” and left them for future committees, citing “the tension between productivity, transparency, and the realities of legislating in a body with 435 individual lawmakers” (H. Rept. 116-562). CRS found majorities of both parties adjusted practice toward limits on amendments (CRS R46841).

Two FY2026 appropriations laws, P.L. 119-74 (168 pages, 140 Stat. 5–172) and P.L. 119-75 (567 pages, 140 Stat. 173–739), ran 735 pages of Volume 140 (GovInfo, P.L. 119-74; P.L. 119-75). The House first voted on each three days after its text was made public, on January 5 and January 19, 2026; the Senate voted 10 and 11 days after, and final passage came 10 and 15 days after (CBO, cost estimate for H.R. 6938; House Appropriations Committee; House Clerk, roll call 7; roll call 45; roll call 53; Senate.gov, record vote 11; record vote 20).

Option: a longer House calendar. For: in an average four-day work period committees have two full days, since the first and last are partial travel days, and the Modernization Committee recommends more workdays spent working than traveling (H. Rept. 116-562). The 1993 joint committee’s House members proposed a four-day legislative week in place of three (H. Rept. 116-562). Against: the House sat 350 days in the 118th Congress against 326 in the 96th while hours per day fell 38%, so added days have not by themselves produced added working hours (Brookings, Chapter 6).